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RECENT DECISIONS
may be joined and damages on each cause of action separately assessed by
special verdict.1 8
In many jurisdictions the defendant may by proper motion require the
plaintiff to consolidate his causes of action.' 9 The purpose underlying this
procedure is to avoid a multiplicity of suits and have the rights of all parties
fully determined in one action. It would seem that the same reasons should
be applied so as to give the plaintiff the right to join the causes of action in
one suit
ROBERT J. KALAFuT
EVIODENCE - PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS - POLICE
RECORDS IN A CIVIL CASE
A chief of police was served with a subpoena duces tecum in connection
with the taking of a deposition in a civil action for a wrongful death, claimed
to have been caused by two police officers of the City of Cleveland. The
subpoena described certain records of the police department made by the
officers at the time of the death. The chief of police had possession of
these records. Notwithstanding an order of the notary, he refused to pro-
duce them on the ground that they were privileged from disclosure. He
was held in contempt of court and placed under technical arrest. On ap-
peal, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to a
write of habeaus corpus.'
The majority of the court stated that it was within the province of the
legislature to provide for instances of a privilege of non-disclosure and that
the courts should" only in extreme cases recognize such instances where
they have not been provided by statutory or constitutional provisions.1' 2 The
dissent reasoned that the circumstances were sufficiently compelling to ex-
tend the privilege since the disclosure of these records would destroy their
usefulness as aids in prosecution and therefore would be against public
policy.3
In a deposition proceeding in Ohio a witness who is not a party to the
action may refuse to answer questions or produce evidence only if that testi-
mony or evidence is privileged.4 A privilege exempting a witness from
testifying or producing evidence must rest on some statutory or constitu-
tional provision. The statutory privileges have been enumerated by Ohio
'In re Story, 159 Ohio Sr. 144, 111 N.E.2d 385 (1953).
2Id. at 151, 111 N.E.2d at 388.
'IbuL. Chief Justice Weygandt and Judge Matthias dissented.
"In re Martin Jr., 141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N.E.2d 388 (1943).
'In re Frye, 155 Ohio St. 345, 98 N.E.2d 788 (1951); Torrance v. Torrance, 147
Ohio St. 169, 70 N.E.2d 365 (1946); Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d
365 (1946); Goehring v. Dilliard, 145 Ohio St. 41, 60 N.E.2d 704 (1945); Bene-
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Revised Code Section 2317.02 (Ohio General Code Section 11494) -
However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has extended the privilege beyond
statutory or constitutional authority.' An example of this extension is found
in cases invoking the attorney-client privilege. By a literal construction of
the privilege statute8 an attorney cannot testify concerning communications
made to him by a client, but there is no privilege regarding the production
of records or testimony concerning them afforded the party or his em-
ployees. Yet, under the attorney-client privilege, the court has often held
that reports and records gathered by transportation companies in prepara-
tion for litigation, in the possession of the company or its employees, are
privileged communications and their production cannot be enforced in the
taking of depositions.9 The court, although broadening the privilege in
this instance, has refused to extend the privilege to the confidential com-
dict v. State, 44 Ohio St. 679, 11 N.E. 125 (1887); Roberts v. Briscoe, 44 Ohio
St. 596, 10 N.E. 61 (1886); In re Raabs Estate, 16 Ohio St. 273 (1865); Bom-
berger v. Turner, 13 Ohio St. 263 (1862).
"The following persois shall not testify in certain respects:
(1) An attorney, concerning a communication made to him by his client in that
relation, or his advice to his client , or a physician concerning communica-
tions made to him by a patient.
(2) A clergyman or priest, concerning a confession.
(3) A husband or wife, concerning any communication made by one to the other
unless made in the known presence of a third person.
(4) A person who assigns his claim or interest concerning any matter in respect
to which he would not if a party be permitted to testify.
(5) A person, who, if a party would be restricted in his evidence under the next
following section. ["Dead Man's Statute"].
"It is apparent, therefore, that this court has extended the privilege against testify-
ing or producing evidence to an instance beyond those supported by statutory or
constitutional provisions." In re Story, 159 Ohio St. 144, 148, 111 N.E.2d 385,
387 (1953).
' See note 6 supra.
'In re Shoup, 154 Ohio St. 221, 94 N.E.2d 625 (1950); In re Hyde, 149 Ohio St.
407, 79 N.E.2d 224 (1948); In re Klemann, 132 Ohio St. 187, 5 N.E.2d 492
(1936); Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906).
The court has, however, distinguished between information obtained in prepara-
tion for litigation and information obtained in the regular course of business. Al-
though both may be in the hands of the company attorney, only the former is
privileged. In re Keough, 151 Ohio St. 307, 85 N.E.2d 550 (1949); In re Hyde,
149 Ohio St. 407, 79 N.E.2d 224 (1948); Furman v. Central Park Plaza, 102
N.E.2d 622 (Cuyahoga Com. Pl. 1951). See 4 WEsT. REs. L. REV. 86 (1952).
"In re Frye, 155 Ohio St. 345, .8 N.E.2d 788 (1951)
"Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1946).
See note 9 Supra.
The federal courts take a liberal view of the deposition discovery proceeding and
restrict privileges to their narrowest permissible limits. Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 67 Sup. Ct. 385 (1946); Reynolds v. U.S., 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cit. 1951);
Brookshire v. Penn. R.R., (N.D. Ohio 1953)
